

TEXT Cincif, Cinepac, Come Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action. Spensavo London and Cincifant for info.

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X this situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ADDES to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost economy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

Copy to (WPD, War Dept) and to Op-12 but no other distribution. Plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (Sec Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, 25 November 1941.

In reply refer to
Initials and No.

HRS/Hu

Sec. #6

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to

authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaign extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some of the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. B. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
California.

P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

HRS.

Nov. 25, 1941.

Summary

Type	Comple- ment fiscal yr 1939	Comple- ment recom- mended by fleet BD	Present comple- ment	Number on bd	% on bd as of Oct. 31 where available other- wise September 30	
					To 1939 comple- ment	To present comple- ment
BBs.....	19,351	26,583	22,244	19,870	102.68	89.32
CVs.....	6,990	7,602	7,258	6,902	98.74	91.68
CAs.....	12,164	18,508	15,878	14,067	115.64	88.59
CLs.....	11,490	15,860	14,156	12,896	112.23	91.09
DDs:						
(1850 Ton).....	3,119	3,900	3,119	2,826	90.60	90.60
(1500 Ton)						
(8 at 192).....	1,536	1,920	1,536	1,346	87.63	87.63
(18 at 191).....	3,438	4,392	3,438	3,138	91.27	91.27
(4 at 196).....	784	1,000	784	728	92.85	92.85
(8 at 178).....	1,424	1,952	1,424	1,312	92.13	92.13
(10 at 187).....	1,870	2,480	1,870	1,717	91.82	91.82
(12 at 200).....	2,400	3,000	2,364	2,171	90.46	91.83
(1200 Ton).....	1,644	1,898	1,716	1,673	101.76	97.49
(Aslatie)						
(4 at 132).....	528	584	536	446	84.46	83.20
(33 at 126).....	3,906	4,626	4,209	3,704	94.82	88.00
SSs:						
(4 at 29).....	174	192	180	230	132.18	127.78
(22 at 39).....	858	946	858	891	103.84	103.84
(22).....	1,203		1,203	1,390	115.54	115.54
(6 at 54).....	324	348	324	375	115.74	115.74
Patrol vessels.....	1,062		1,078	1,109	104.42	102.87
OGALA.....	282		320	290	102.83	90.62
ISABEL.....	84		84	82	97.61	97.61
TOTALS.....	76,631		84,849	77,163	103.39	90.94

EXHIBIT No. 17

SEALED ENCLAVE

Naval Message - Navy Department

Phone Reference Number (PT 11-141, 1940)	Address	Message Procedure
From Chief of Naval Operations..... Delivered by Imperial..... Date November 27, 1941.	For all four CINCPAC CINCPAC	Priority X to be Deferred
TO: Commanders..... Delivered by..... Transmitted by.....	Information CINCLANT SPINATO	Priority Message Deferred

Indicate by suitable notation for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

CIVIL SERVICE MESSAGE

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originate in date and time for dispatch and mail delivery.

Text.—This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition probably against either the Philippines or KRA Peninsula or possibly Borneo X. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46X. Inform district and army authorities X. A similar warning is being sent by War Department X. Spence inform British X. Continental districts Guam, Samoa direct take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD War Dept.

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art. 76 (1) Nav. Regs.